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18 April 1968

L-7918

Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File

Attention: Dr. Ivan Selin
Director for Strategic Programs

Dear Ivan:

(U) The last meeting went fairly well I thought. The consultants were please with it, in any case. We had a good session on Saturday, discussing how to best use the next couple of months.

(U) The general schedule we have to propose is the following:

(U) 1. It was impossible to agree on a date for a meeting next month. Hence, the next meeting will be the previously scheduled June 7 and 8 meeting.

(U) 2. The next meeting, after this, the final meeting, we propose for July 29 and 30. Christensen will not be able to attend the meeting on the 30th, but we ought to schedule it for two days nonetheless. The purpose of the final meeting would be to discuss the final report of the consultants. How best to arrange this discussion deserves some further thought. I would hope that we can circulate a draft of the report about mid-July which would allow for questioning and commentary, both by the consultants and by people from the Intelligence Community.

(U) 3. The Consultants read and discussed the attached draft. March liked it more than the other two. I have asked Bower and Christensen to give me comments and ideas for alternative hypotheses. Some of the ideas in the draft will be incorporated in the final report. However, over the next month I will be elaborating a more detailed version of what the final report might consist of. About mid-May I expect to circulate at least an outline of the final report for comment and suggestions. When this outline is available I will send a copy to you.

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(C) 4. It seems likely that the final report will contain at least the following sections:

- (a) Observations on current methods of thinking about Soviet behavior by the Intelligence Community.
- (b) Elaborations of several alternative hypotheses about Soviet behavior that we would hope would be given serious attention in the future.
- (c) Reason why we believe these hypotheses, or models, ought to be taken seriously, and the likely impact they might have on problems of the sort you are interested in.
- (d) Some suggested first steps to improve understanding of the behavior of Soviet military organizations.

(U) 5. Both the Consultants and I agree that we ought to try to be as helpful as we can to you in suggesting hypotheses that might explain some of the puzzles we have been discussing. We think we can also characterize in general terms the kind of interaction process that we would expect to take place between two big complicated military bureaucracies; i.e., the U.S. and Soviet military establishments. We would like also to be as helpful as we can to the Intelligence people in suggesting hypotheses that we think they ought to take more seriously. Both in terms of the way they think about the Soviets, as well as in the materials they attempt to collect, and the type of analysis that they give to it. Finally, there seems to be general agreement that we would like to find some way of continuing to be helpful to the Intelligence Community, should they wish to undertake a longer-term effort to look at the Soviet military organizations from a slightly new and different point of view.

(U) At the Saturday meeting we went over a number of proposed agenda items for the June 7 - 8 meeting. As soon as possible, you ought to get together with some of the people at the agency and FTD, to make arrangements for the next meeting. Some of the topic items will probably require special planning, and some, while interesting, might not be feasible. As soon as you can, why don't you get back to me and we can discuss the final form of the agenda for the June 7 - 8 meeting.

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(C) Proposed agenda items are as follows:

(C) 1. FTD briefing on the weapons systems R&D process, the operation of the design bureaus, etc. We give this briefing high priority and are willing to spend two hours or perhaps a whole morning or afternoon on this briefing. In previous letters I have indicated some of our interests in this area. Please pass along to FTD past descriptions of our interest. In summary, we want to know as much as we can about the sources of new weapons systems, the process by which they are agreed to and funded, the institutional relationship of the design bureaus to specific parts of the Soviet military establishment, such as the Navy, PVO, Strategic Rocket forces, etc. Please sent the FTD people a copy of the draft attached to this letter, since it might be of some use to them, in indicating some areas of our interest. That draft emphasizes the role of the design bureaus and the lower level technological agencies in generating new weapons systems. However, we need to know as much as we can about the role of the top levels in the Soviet military organization in selecting among alternatives presented to them. There is a special interest in understanding the funding and selection process. We would also like to know about links of design bureaus with particular production units in the Soviet military industrial complex.

*Done FTD
know about
these things?*

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(C) 2. In a session with [REDACTED] and others at the Agency several weeks ago, it was suggested that there may be available one or more Soviet defectors who would be useful sources of information on the operation of the career systems within the Soviet military organization. The consultants would like to obtain information about the promotion systems, the incentive and measurement systems, within the Soviet military services. To get a better picture of what it is like to be a middle-level officer in these organizations. Hence, we would like to explore the possibility of a meeting with one or more of these defectors. || 7
Probably this ought to be organized not in terms of the large meetings we have had, but perhaps just the consultants, yourself, an Agency representative, and the defector. Why don't you see what the difficulties might be in arranging such a meeting? If need be, couldn't we fit this in on the Friday evening of the next meeting?

(C) 3. A detailed session on the SS-11 would be interesting. In particular, the SS-11 program appears to have developed from a major top-level decision. Since this might have been in reaction to a crisis, perhaps a response to the Cuban crisis, a detailed picture of what we know of the timing of the decisions, and anything else that would tell us more about the decision to embark on the SS-11

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would be useful. We would be less interested in a detailed technological report on the SS-11. But anything that would illuminate the decision process with regard to the initiation of the program, the unusual nature of the program, might be useful.

(C) At the last meeting several past studies were cited concerning patterns in the deployment of Soviet missiles that have been used to make inferences about Soviet targeting, etc. It might be interesting if someone could collect and summarize for us the patterns that one sees in Soviet behavior that are currently used for the making of inferences with regard to Soviet missile programs.

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- (C) 4. There is some material collected in the middle-'50s that is handled under a special code name that begins with the letter R. In the past, [REDACTED] has indicated that this material might be of interest to us. One of the NSA people at the meeting indicated to me that he would look into the status of that material, the availability of knowledgeable persons, etc. It may be that there are materials and knowledgeable people available to put together some interesting insights as to the internal politics and working of parts of the Soviet military establishment. Perhaps you can find some way of exploring this. You have a feeling for the kinds of information likely to be of interest and could judge whether a suitable briefing or discussion can be arranged. If need be, I can come back to Washington the middle of next month to be in on any discussions of the usefulness of a session material from this source.
- (U) 5. At the next meeting, I think we should have a session discussing the outline, or a preliminary draft, of the consultants' final report with interested parties. So I think that this should be scheduled as part of the agenda for the next meeting. I have already mentioned that I will be circulating a very preliminary version of at least the outline of a report by the middle of May. By the June 7 - 8 meeting, I should be ready to distribute and discuss a revised outline or draft of the report.
- (C) 6. As mentioned above in a couple of connections, we would like to know a lot more about the budgeting, financing mechanisms within the Soviet military establishments, particularly as regards the generation of new weapons systems. Can we get anything on this matter? How are funds channelled and controlled to research and development projects, to procurement projects, to current operating expenses, etc. The more detailed a description we could have of this, the better. Perhaps an Agency paper on this matter would be prepared?

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(C) 7. We know that in the past our perception of Soviet military forces, especially projections of future forces, was influenced by the fact that there were three Service Intelligence organizations with specific responsibilities. Some distortion resulted. What do we know of the organization of Soviet Intelligence that might be useful in understanding how they see us? What are the likely biases? What role, if any, do the major subparts of the Soviet Military establishment play in formulating estimates of future U.S. forces? Does the PVO make estimates for planning purposes?

(C) What do we know of Soviet efforts to follow U.S. military technology? What role do Soviet technical committees, etc. play?

(C) Please call me if you have any questions. I can come to Washington any time for a couple of days to discuss matters, preferably around the middle of May.

Sincerely,

A. W. Marshall
Economics Department

AMM:cc

Encl - "Draft Statement of Hypotheses Concerning Soviet R&D Process(U)"
by A. W. Marshall, dated April 18, 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL), one copy

CC: Bruce Clarke, [REDACTED] - CIA
Kenneth Roberts, Dr. Morton Halperin - DoD/ISA
Robert Kilmarx, Major General Jack E. Thomas - USAF

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